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1 Introduction
Business-cycle models give a central position to productivity and demand shocks, and the role of
financial markets in the propagation of these shocks; but they typically take the entire productivity
process as exogenous. Growth models, on the other hand, give a central position to endogenous
productivity growth, and the role of financial markets in the growth process; but they focus on
trends, largely ignoring shocks and cycles.
The broader goal of this paper is to build a theory of the joint determination of growth and
volality. Of course, ours is not the first attempt to do so.1 The novelty of our approach rests in
the particular propagation mechanism that we consider: we study how financial frictions impact
the composition of investment over the business cycle, and the implications that this in turn has
for both volatility and growth.
Theory. In our model, firms engage in two alternative types of investment. Short-term invest-
ment takes relatively little time to build and therefore generates output (and liquidity) relatively
quickly. Long-term investment takes more time to complete, but also contributes more to produc-
tivity growth. By design, the overall supply of capital goods does not vary over the business cycle.
This permits us to isolate the novel composition effects that are the core of our contribution from
more conventional propagation mechanisms that work through the response of aggregate saving
and overall investment to the underlying business-cycle shocks.
With perfect credit markets, the equilibrium composition of investment is dictated merely by
an opportunity-cost effect. As long as shocks are mean reverting, short-term returns are more
procyclical than long-term returns. That is, the relative demand for long-term investment is higher
in recessions than in booms. It follows that the fraction of capital allocated to long-term investment
opportunities is countercyclical.
With sufficiently tight credit constraints, this fraction turns procyclical. This is not because
credit constraints limit the ability to invest as in standard credit-multiplier models: in equilibrium,
neither type of investment is constrained ex ante. Rather, it is because tighter constraints imply a
higher probability that long-term investment will be interrupted by a liquidity shock. Ex ante, the
anticipation of this risk reduces the willingness to engage in long-term investment—and the more
so in recessions, when firms expect liquidity to remain relatively scarce for a while.
The first main prediction of our model is therefore that tighter credit constraints contribute
to a more procyclical share of long-term investment. We view this result regarding the cyclical
composition of investment as the core theoretical contribution of our paper. This result in turn
generates two additional sets of predictions.
1For other contributions in this direction, see Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Caballero and Hammour (1994),
Comin and Gertler (2006), Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003), Jones, Manuelli and Stacchetti (2000), King and Rebelo
(1993), Stadler (1990), Obstfeld (1994), and Walde (2004).
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Because long-term investment enhances productivity more than short-term investment, tighter
credit constraints also induce procyclicality in the growth rate of the economy. In particular, the
cyclical behavior of the composition of investment mitigates fluctuations when financial markets
are perfect, but amplifies them when credit constraints are sufficiently tight. This amplification
effect is therefore the second main prediction of our paper. At the same time, because tighter credit
constraints increase the liquidity risk involved in long-term investments, they reduce the average
propensity to engage in such investments. In so doing, they also reduce the mean growth rate of
the economy. This growth effect is the third main prediction of our paper.
Combined, these results mean that financial frictions contribute to both lower mean growth and
higher volatility. Importantly, what drives these results is not the cyclical behavior of aggregate
saving and investment, as in most other models of financial frictions, but rather the cyclical com-
position of investment. Our paper thus makes a distinct contribution towards understanding the
joint determination of growth and volatility in the cross-section of countries.
Empirics. We examine the empirical performance of the theory within a panel of 21 OECD
countries over the 1960-2000 period. As a proxy for our model’s business-cycle shocks, we consider
innovations in commodity prices, weighted by the contribution of these commodities to each coun-
try’s net exports. This measure of shocks is appealing because price fluctuations in international
commodity markets are largely exogenous to each individual economy. As a proxy for the share of
long-term investment, we take the ratio of structural investment to total private investment. This
measure captures long-term projects that are likely to be productivity-enhancing, and has system-
atically been collected for a large sample of countries over a 40-year period.2 Finally, as a proxy
for the potential tightness of credit constraints, we use the ratio of private credit to GDP. This
is a standard measure of financial development in the finance-and-growth literature, and provides
substantial time-series and cross-sectional variation in our panel.
Using these empirical proxies, we find strong support for our model’s key predictions. First,
the impact of shocks on the share of structural investment is greater in countries at lower levels
of financial development. By contrast, no such effect is observed for the overall investment rate.
Second, tighter credit amplifies the effects of shocks on output growth. Moreover, this result is not
driven by the aggregate investment rate. Finally, financially underdeveloped countries feature less
growth, more volatility, and a more strong negative correlation between growth and volatility.
Related literature. The growth and volatility effects of credit frictions have, of course, been
the subject of a voluminous literature, including Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999), Aghion and
Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), King and Levine (1993),
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); see Levine (1997) for an excellent review and more references. We
depart from this earlier work by studying how liquidity risk affects the cyclical composition of
2While R&D expenditure is another natural proxy for long-term productivity-enhancing investments, we opted
away from it because of the poor quality of the cross-country R&D data. See the remark at the end of Section 6.2.
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investment as opposed to the overall rate of investment. Many other papers—including Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997), Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998), Barlevy (2004), Comin and Gertler (2004),
Hall (1991), Gali and Hammour (1991), Koren and Tenreyro (2007), and Walde (2004)—do look
at the allocation of investment across alternative uses; but they do not consider the impact of
credit frictions and liquidity risk as our paper. Finally, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) propose a
theory of countercyclical markups whose mechanics resemble those of our theory, once appropriately
re-interpreted.3
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some empirical and
theoretical considerations that motivate our exercise. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4
analyzes the equilibrium composition of investment, while Section 5 derives the implications for
growth and volatility. Section 6 contains the empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Some motivating background
In an influential paper, Ramey and Ramey (1995) document a negative correlation between the
volatility and the mean rate of output growth in a cross-section of countries. They show that this
correlation survives a variety of controls and go on to argue that it admits a causal interpretation.4
Our paper is about the joint determination of volatility and growth, rather than the causal effect of
the former on the latter. Nevertheless, the findings in Ramey and Ramey (1995) provide a certain
motivation and guidance for our own theoretical and empirical explorations.
An negative effect of volatility on growth is consistent with the one-sector neoclassical growth
model if risk discourages demand for investment more than it encourages the precautionary supply
of savings, which is typically the case if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is sufficiently
high (Obstfeld, 1994; King and Rebelo, 1993; Jones, Manuelli and Stacchetti, 2000). A similar result
can be obtained within the neoclassical growth model for the case of idiosyncratic investment risk
(Angeletos, 2007). Such an effect is also consistent with models featuring financial frictions in the
tradition of Bernanke and Gertler (1989): higher volatility may increase the likelihood of binding
credit constraints and thereby reduce investment.
However, none of these stories seems to explain the observed negative correlation between
volatility and growth. If these stories were the key behind this correlation, one would expect that
controlling for the aggregate rate of investment would remove most of this correlation. As shown
in columns 1-4 of Table 1, that’s not the case. In these columns, we re-estimate some of the basic
3That paper argues that young firms have an incentive to keep their markups low in the hope of building up higher
market shares, but this effect is likely to lower when bankruptcy risk is higher. The similarity to our paper then rests
on re-interpreting the choice of a low markup as a long-term investment and the bankruptcy risk as liquidity risk.
4Complementary evidence is provided by Blattman, Hwang and Williamson (2004), Koren and Tenreyro (2007),
and others. See, however, Chatterjee and Shukayev (2005) and Ramey and Ramey (2006) for a debate on how
sensitive these findings are to the particular measurement of output growth.
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Table 1. Average growth, growth volatility and investment volatility
Dependent variable:  Average growth, 1960-2000 Growth volatility, 1960-2000
Investment volatility, 
1960-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
initial income 0.002 -0.010 -0.006 -0.010 -0.012 -0.005 -0.940 -1.526
(0.88) (-3.31)*** (-3.59)*** (-4.07)*** (-3.23)*** (-1.22) (-2.18)** (-2.63)**
growth volatility -0.127 -0.116 -0.113 -0.101
(-2.10)** (-1.27) (-2.64)*** (-1.35)
investment/GDP 0.002 0.001
(10.11)*** (5.64)***
private credit -0.024 -0.006 0.577 2.362
(-2.09)** (-0.52) (0.43) (1.41)
Controls:
pop growth, sec enroll no yes no yes no yes no yes
Levine et al. policy set no yes no yes no yes no yes
R-squared 0.078 0.423 0.540 0.617 0.241 0.498 0.052 0.369
N 106 73 106 73 106 73 106 73
Note: All regressors are averages over the 1960-2000 period, except for initial income and secondary school enrollment, which are taken for
1960. Growth and investment volatility are constructed as the standard deviation of annual growth and the share of total investment in GDP in
the 1960-2000 period respectively. The Levine et al. policy set of controls includes government size as a share of GDP, inflation, black market
premium, and trade openness. Constant term not shown. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
specifications from Ramey and Ramey (1995) in our dataset. The point estimate of the volatility
coefficient falls only by one tenth when the investment rate is included as an additional control.
The data therefore suggest that the observed negative relation between volatility and growth is not
channeled through the overall rate of saving and investment.
Morevoer, whereas there is suggestive evidence that credit access predicts both the mean and
the volatility of the growth rate,5 a first pass at the data gives no indication that credit predicts the
volatility of the aggregate investment rate. In our sample, the cross-country correlation between
a country’s ratio of private credit to GDP—the measure of financial development usually used in
the literature—and the country’s mean growth rate is 0.49, and the correlation between private
credit and the variance of the growth rate is −0.42. By contrast, the correlation between private
credit and the standard deviation of the ratio of investment to GDP is about zero (only −0.06).
Moreover, when in columns 7 and 8 of Table 1 we repeat the same regressions as in columns 5 and
6 now using the standard deviation of the investment rate as the dependent variable, we find no
relationship between the latter and the quality of the financial sector. Once again, this suggests that
the volatility effects of credit constrains are not channeled through the overall rate of investment.
Taken together, these observations indicate that one should look beyond the standard trans-
mission channel—the response of aggregate saving and investment—in order to understand the
interaction of effect of uncertainty and credit constraints on growth and volatility. Our approach
5If we include credit in the regressions of columns 1-4, then its effect on mean growth is positive, as standard in
the literature. Its effect on growth volatility, on the other hand, is negative, as shown in columns 5 and 6.
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then rests on shifting focus from the average rate of investment to its composition.
3 The model
We consider a closed economy that is populated by overlapping generations of a single type of
agents, whom we call “entrepreneurs”. Each generation consists of a unit mass of entrepreneurs.
Each entrepreneur lives for three periods and is endowed with one unit of labor in each period of
her life. There is a single consumption good and two types of capital goods.
Consider an entrepreneur born in period t. Her labor endowment, measured in efficiency units,
is denoted by Ht. We can think of Ht as the stock of human capital, skills, and other know-how that
an entrepreneur has acquired by the time she starts engaging in productive activities. To simplify
the analysis, we assume that this stock is fixed over the productive life of an entrepreneur and
exogenous to her production choices. At the same time, we allow the growth rate of Ht to depend
on the general equilibrium of the economy through a certain type of intergenerational spillover
effects, similar in spirit to those in Lucas (1988); we specify these spillover effects later on. Finally,
the preferences of this entrepreneur are given by
Ut = Ct,t + βCt,t+1 + β2Ct,t+2 (1)
where Ct,t+n ≥ 0 denotes her consumption during period t + n, for n ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and β > 0 is her
discount factor.
In the first period of her life (period t), the entrepreneur has access to two CRS technologies
that permit her to transform her effective labor to either of the two types of capital goods. In the
subsequent two periods of her life, the entrepreneur has no more access to this capital-producing
technology, but she can now use her stock of capital goods along with her endowment of labor
to produce a consumption good under some other CRS technology. In particular, both types of
investment have to be installed during the first period of the entrepreneur’s life (period t) and
cannot be reallocated afterwards, but the one type becomes productive in the second period of her
life (period t + 1), while the other type becomes productive in the third period of her life (period
t + 2). In what follows, we interpret the former type of capital as short-term investment and the
latter one as long-term investment.
Consider first the production of capital goods. Since labor is the only input used in the produc-
tion of the capital goods, the CRS assumption means that the corresponding production functions
are linear. Let the technology of producing the short-term capital goods be Kt = θk,tHk,t, where
Hk,t is the amount of effective labor allocated to this technology, θk,t is the corresponding produc-
tivity, and Kt is the produced amount of short-term capital goods. Similarly, let the technology
of producing the long-term capital goods be Zt = θz,tHz,t, where Hz,t is the amount of effective
labor allocated to this technology, θz,t is the corresponding productivity, and Kt is the produced
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amount of short-term capital goods. We abstract from shocks to these productivities and, without
any further loss of generality, we set θk,t = θz,t = θ for some fixed θ > 0.6
Consider, next, the production of the consumption good. As mentioned already, short-term
investment produces the consumption good with only a one-period lag. Thus, an entrepreneur who
is born in period t produces the following amount of the consumption good in period t+ 1:
Yt,t+1 = At+1F (Kt, Ht) (2)
where At+1 is an exogenous aggregate productivity shock, Kt is the stock of short-term capital
goods that the entrepreneur installed in period t, Ht is her effective labor, and F is a neoclassical
production function. For simplicity, we assume that F is Cobb-Douglas: F (K,H) = KαH1−α, for
some α ∈ (0, 1).
Long-term investment, on the other hand, takes one additional period in order to produce the
consumption good. During this extra time, the entrepreneur may face an idiosyncratic “liquditiy”
risk. By this we mean the following. In period t + 1, the entrepreneur is hit by an idiosyncratic
shock, denoted by Lt+1 ≥ 0. This shock identifies a random expense, in terms of the consumption
good, that the entrepreneur must incur in order to guarantee that her long-term investment remains
intact. In particular, if the entrepreneur succeeds in covering this random expense, then she is able
to produce the following amount of the consumption good in period t+ 2:
Yt,t+2 = At+2F (Zt, Ht), (3)
where At+2 is the aggregate productivity shock in period t+ 2, Zt is the stock of long-term capital
goods that the entrepreneur installed in period t, and Ht is her effective labor. If, instead, the
entrepreneur fails to cover this expense, then her long-term capital goods become obsolete and
therefore her output in period t + 2 is zero. We henceforth call this situation the “failure” or
“liquidation” of the entrepreneur’s long-term investment.7
We further assume that, if the entrepreneur covers the liquidity shock in period t+1, she recovers
fully the associated expense in period t+ 2 along with any foregone interest: conditional on paying
Lt+1 in period t + 1, she receives β−1Lt+1 in period t + 2. This assumption guarantees that this
shock does not affect the net present value of the long-term investment of the entrepreneur; it only
affects the intertemporal pattern of its gross costs and benefits.8 This assumption thus permits us
6In equilibrium, all entrepreneurs will choose the same levels of short-term and long-term investment (because they
have identical preferences, they face the same technologies and distribution of shocks, and their investment problem
is strictly convex). For this reason, and to simplify the notation, we do not index individual investment choices by the
identity of the entrepreneur, and instead use Kt and Zt to denote either individual or aggregate investment choices.
However, one has to keep in mind that each entrepreneur is subject to an idiosyncratic liquidity risk, which implies
that different entrepreneurs may end up with different realized incomes even though they make identical choices.
7The fact that we model “failure” or “liquidation” as full, rather than partial, depreciation is only for simplicity.
8Here, we anticipate the fact that, because preferences are linear, the equilibrium interest rate will be Rt = β
−1.
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to identify the shock Lt+1 as a pure liquidity shock: the presence of this shock has no effect on
equilibrium allocations when markets are complete, but starts playing a crucial role once markets
are incomplete. That being said, our key results do not hinge on this assumption. What is essential
for our purposes is only that this shock induces a countercyclical liquidity risk when markets are
incomplete; whether it may also happen to affect the present value of investment is of secondary
importance, which is why we find it best to abstract from this effect.
In particular, we specify the financial structure of the economy as follows. First, we assume
that the entrepreneurs can trade only a riskless short-term bond. Second, we impose an ad-hoc
borrowing constraint that requires that the net borrowing of an entrepreneur in the first or second
period of her life does not exceed a multiple µ of her contemporaneous income (where µ ≥ 0). It
follows that we can write the budget and borrowing constraints of the entrepreneur in these periods
as follows: for the first period,
Ct,t + qt(Kt + Zt) = qtθHt +Bt,t and Bt,t ≤ µqtHt, (4)
where Ct,t is her first-period consumption, qt is the unit price of capital goods at date t, qt(Kt+Zt)
is her purchases of capital goods, Bt,t is her first-period borrowing (or saving, if this number is
negative), and qtθHt is her income from the production and sale of capital goods, while for the
second period,
Ct,t+1 + Lt+1et,t+1 = Yt,t+1 +Bt,t+1 − (1 +Rt)Bt,t and Bt,t+1 ≤ µYt,t+1, (5)
where Ct,t+1 is her second-period consumption, Lt+1 is the liquidity shock, et,t+1 is an indicator
function that takes the value 1 if the entrepreneur covers this shock and 0 otherwise, Bt,t+1 is her
second-period borrowing, Yt,t+1 is her income from short-term investment, and Rt is the risk-free
rate between periods t and t+ 1. In the third period, on the other hand, we impose that no further
borrowing is allowed because the entrepreneur will die after this period. Her budget constraint is
thus given by
Ct,t+2 = (Yt,t+2 + β−1Lt+1)et+1 + (1 +Rt+2)Bt,t+1, (6)
where Ct,t+2 is her third-period consumption, Yt,t+2 is her income from long-term investment and
β−1Lt+1 is the recovery of the previous-period liquidity expense.
To close the model, we need to specify the dynamics of the stock of human capital (Ht), the
stochastic process of the aggregate productivity shock (At) and the idiosyncratic liquidity shock
(Lt). We do so as follows.
For the stock of human capital (or level of know-how), we assume the following law of motion:
Ht+1 = Γ(Ht, Z˜t,Kt)
where Z˜t denotes the amount of long-term investment that survives the liquidity shock (to be de-
termined in equilibrium) and where the function Γ is continuous and increasing in all its arguments.
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To guarantee a balanced-growth path, we assume that Γ is homogenous of degree 1. We further
assume that, for any H and any given sum Z +K, Γ(H,Z,K) increases with the ratio Z/K. With
this assumption we seek to capture the idea that many long-term investments such as education,
firm entry, R&D, and the like appear to be relatively more conducive to productivity growth than
short-term investments in working capital, machines, and the like. This in turn will permit us to
spell out the potential implications of our results for the dynamics of growth without going into
the deeper micro-foundations of productivity growth.
Next, for the productivity shock, we assume that its logarithm follows an AR(1) process:
logAt = ρ logAt−1 + log νt (7)
where νt is the innovation in the productivity shock—a random variable that is i.i.d. over time,
with mean normalized to E[νt] = 1, positive higher moments, and compact support [νmin, νmax],
with 0 < νmin < νmax <∞—and where ρ ∈ (0, 1) parameterizes the persistence of the productivity
shock. The key property we seek to capture with this specification is that the business cycle features
both some persistence (ρ > 0) and some mean-reversion (ρ < 1). This is essential for our argument.
The log-linearity, instead, is not essential; it only buys us some tractability in computing conditional
expectations for future productivity shocks.
Finally, for the liquidity shock, we assume that it grows in proportion to Ht so as to guarantee
that the economy admits a balanced growth path along which the impact of the liquidity risk
does not vanish as the economy grows. Formally, we let `t+1 ≡ Lt+1/Ht denote the “normalized”
level of the liquidity shock and impose that the distribution of `t+1 is invariant over time; we
then let [0, `max] be the support of this distribution and Φ its c.d.f..9 We further impose that
`max > AmaxF (θ, 1), where `max and Amax ≡ νmax/(1−ρ) are, respectively, the maximum possible
realizations of the liquidity shock and of the productivity shock; as it will become clear, this
restriction guarantees that the entrepreneur will fail to meet the maximal liquidity shock when
credit markets are sufficiently tight (µ is sufficiently small). Finally, to maintain tractability, we
impose a power-form specification: Φ(`) = (`/`max)
φ when ` < `max, for some φ > 0, and Φ(`) = 1
when ` ≥ `max.10
9An alternative specification of the liquidity shock that would also guarantee the existence of such a balanced-
growth path is one that specifies the shock Lt+1 as proportional to the level Zt+1 of the enterpreneur’s long-term
investment. In this case, the exogenous, stationary shock would be given by `t+1 ≡ Lt+1/Zt+1. Furthermore,
thanks to the CRS property of the production function, one could then interpret the probability that Lt+1 ≤ Xt+1
interchangeably either as the probability that the entire long-term investment of the entrepreneur survives to period
t+ 2, or as the fraction of her long-term capital stock that survives to period t+ 2. Finally, because this specification
retains the key property of our model, namely that the liquidity risk is countercyclical, it also does not affect the
core of our key predictions. However, this specification is more cumbersome analytically, which is why we opted for
the simpler one we have assumed.
10As it will become clear, the parameter φ, which identifies the elasticity of Φ, governs the cyclical elasticity of the
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Remarks. There are various interpretations of what the two types of investment and the liq-
uidity shock may represent. The short-term investment might be putting money into one’s current
business, while the long-term productivity-enhancing investment may be starting a new business.
Or, the short-term investment may be maintaining existing equipment or buying a machine of the
same vintage as the ones already installed, while the long-term investment is building an additional
plant, building a research lab, learning a new skill, or adopting a new technology. Similarly, the
liquidity shock might be an extra cost necessary for a newly-adopted technology to be adapted to
evolving market conditions; or a health problem that the entrepreneur needs to deal with; or some
other idiosyncratic shock that can ruin the entrepreneur’s business unless she can repair the dam-
age from it. Finally, the fact that long-term productivity-enhancing investments such as starting
up a new business, learning a new skill, adopting a new technology, or undertaking a new R&D
project are largely intangible and non-verifiable may justify our implicit assumption that a large
portion of these investments is not collateralizable—and hence that these investments may get dis-
rupted by liquidity shocks even if they have positive net present value. In this regard, although
we abstract from the micro-foundations of liquidity constraints, we are essentially building on the
insights of the related literature on moral hazard and credit constraints, such as Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998) and Aghion, Banarjee and Piketty (1999). Indeed, note that the latter paper provides
a microfoundation of the particular borrowing constraint we assume in this paper.
4 Equilibrium composition of investment
In this section we analyze the equilibrium composition of investment, starting first with the case
where markets are perfect and then moving to the case where credit constraints are binding. Our
model is designed so that the characterization of the equilibrium composition of investment can
be derived without characterizing the equilibrium dynamics of Ht. This highlights that the core
contribution of our paper regards the cyclical composition of investment. We will spell out the
implications of our results for output volatility and growth in a subsequent section.
4.1 Complete markets
Suppose that credit markets are perfect and consider an entrepreneur born in period t. Because the
entrepreneur can borrow as much as she wishes in the second period of her life, she can always meet
her liquidity shock, should she find it desirable to do so. Because of the linearity of preferences,
the equilibrium interest rate is pinned down by Rt = β−1. It follows that the net present value of
meeting the liquidity shock is (Yt,t+2 + β−1Lt+1)−Rt+1Lt+1 = Yt,t+2 = At+2F (Zt, Ht) ≥ 0, which
guarantees that it is always optimal for the entrepreneur to meet her liquidity shock.
liquidity risk faced by the entrepreneur. When the elasticity of Φ is not constant, our equilibrium characterization
can be interpreted as a log-linear approximation around the steady state.
9
Next, the budget constraints along with the fact that Rt = β−1 imply that the present value of
the entrepreneur’s consumption—also her lifetime utility—is pinned down by the following:
Ut = Ct,t + βCt,t+1 + β2Ct,t+2
= qt(θHt −Kt − Zt) + β(Yt,t+1 − Lt+1) + β2(Yt,t+2 + β−1Lt+1)
= qt(θHt −Kt − Zt) + βAt+1F (Kt, Ht) + β2At+2F (Zt, Ht)
We infer that the optimal investment problem of the entrepreneur can be reduced to the following:
max
Kt,Zt
Et
[
βAt+1F (Kt, Ht) + β2At+2F (Zt, Ht)− qtKt − qtZt
]
Let kt ≡ Kt/Ht and zt ≡ Zt/Ht denote the “normalized” levels of short- and long-term invest-
ment. We can then restate the entrepreneur’s problem as follows:
max
kt,zt
Et
[
βAt+1f(kt) + β2At+2f(zt)− qtkt − qtzt
]
Because f is strictly concave, the solution to the above problem, for given qt, is uniquely pinned
down by the following first-order conditions:
βEt[At+1f ′(kt)] = qt and β2Et[At+2f ′(zt)] = qt. (8)
That is, the entrepreneur equates the marginal cost of the two types of investment (the price qt)
with their expected marginal profit.
The individual entrepreneur takes the price of capital goods, qt, as exogenous to her choices. In
equilibrium, however, this price adjusts to make sure that the aggregate excess demand for capital
goods is zero. In other words, the equilibrium investment levels must satisfy the resource constraint
Kt + Zt = θHt, where, recall, θ is the productivity of new-born entrepreneurs in the production of
capital goods. Equivalently, the normalized levels must satisfy
kt + zt = θ.
Combining this with (8), we infer that the equilibrium composition of investment is pinned down
by the following condition:
Et[At+1f ′(θ − zt)] = βEt[At+2f ′(zt)] (9)
This condition has a straightforward interpretation: it equates the marginal value of long-term
investment (on the right-hand side) with its opportunity cost (on the left-hand side).
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we only need to ensure that there are
enough aggregate resources to pay for the liquidity shocks in each period. To do so, we henceforth
impose that the parameters of the economy satisfy lmean < Aminf(θ − zmax), where zmax is the
solution to condition (8) when At = Amin, and where Amin and lmean are, respectively, the minimum
productivity level and the mean liquidity shock.11 We then reach our first main result.
11Alternatively, we could relax this parameter restriction and instead permit consumption to be negative.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that credit markets are perfect.
(i) The equilibrium exists and is unique.
(ii) There exists a continuous function z∗ : R+ → (0, θ) such that the equilibrium levels of
short-term and long-term investment are given, respectively, by kt = θ − z∗(At) and zt = z∗(At).
(iii) The function z∗ is strictly decreasing. That is, the share of long-term investment decreases
with a positive innovation in productivity.
Proof. By the AR(1) specification of the process for the productivity shock, we have that
Et[At+1] = Et[νt+1Aρt ] = A
ρ
t and Et[At+2] = Et[Et+1[At+2]] = Et[A
ρ
t+1] = Et[(vt+1A
ρ
t )
ρ] = χAρ
2
t ,
where χ ≡ E[νρt ] > 0. Rearranging condition (9), and using the aforementioned facts, we get that
the equilibrium zt is pinned down by the following equation:
f ′(zt)
f ′(θ − zt) =
Et[At+1]
βEt[At+2]
=
A
ρ(1−ρ)
t
βχ
Note that the left-hand side of the above equation is continuous and decreasing in zt, while the
right-hand side is continuous and increasing in At. Furthermore, the left-hand side tends to +∞
(respectively, 0) as zt → 0 (respectively, θ). Parts (ii) and (iii) then follow from the Implicit
Function Theorem. Finally, part (i) follows from part (ii) along with the fact that the assumption
lmean < Aminf(θ − zmax), where zmax = z∗(Amin), guarantees that consumption is positive in all
states. QED
The logic behind this result is very basic and hence likely to extend to richer environments.
As long as there is mean-reversion in the business cycle, profits anticipated in the near future are
likely to be more pro-cyclical than profits anticipated in the distant future. Moreover, the return to
short-term investment depends more heavily on profits in the near future, while the return to long-
term investment depends more heavily on profits in the distant future. It follows that the return
of short-term investment is likely to be more procyclical than the return to long-term investment
and, therefore, the composition of investment is likely to shift towards a relatively higher share of
long-term investment during recessions than during booms.
At the core of this result is a particular type of opportunity-cost effect : the opportunity cost of
long-term investment, in terms of forgone short-term investment opportunities, is higher in booms
than in recessions. This opportunity-cost effect, which induces countercylicality in the share of
long-term investment, is present independently of whether credit markets are perfect or not; but
once markets are imperfect, an additional, countervailing effect emerges. We move on to identify
this additional effect in the next section.
Remark. Proposition 1 stated the cyclical properties of the composition of investment in terms
of its co-movement with the productivity shock. However, it is straightforward to translate these
properties in terms of the co-movement of the two types of investment with aggregate output (which
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is the canonical definition of cyclical properties). To see this, note that the equilibrium level of
GDP, evaluated in units of the consumption good, can be written as follows:
GDPt = Atf(kt−1) +Atf(zt−2) + qtkt + qtzt. (10)
The first two terms on the right-hand side capture the value added of the consumption sector, while
the last two terms capture the value added of the investment sector. Clearly, the first two terms
increase with a positive innovation in At. By Proposition 1 and the fact that qt = E[At+2]f ′(zt) in
equilibrium, we have that qt also increases with a positive innovation in At. Since kt + zt = θ is
constant, we conclude that GDPt, too, increases with a positive innovation in At. It follows that
the contemporaneous covariance between GDP and the share of long-term investment is indeed
negative.
4.2 Incomplete markets
Consider now the case where credit markets are imperfect. Once again, the linearity of preferences
guarantees that Rt = β−1. But now the entrepreneur is not completely indifferent about the
timing of her consumption and the pattern of her borrowing and saving. In particular, because
the probability of failing to meet the liquidity shock is positive, the entrepreneur finds it strictly
optimal to consume zero in the first period of her life—for doing so maximizes the availability of
funds in the second period and thereby minimizes the probability of failure. Furthermore, whenever
the entrepreneur has enough funds herself in the second period to cover her liquidity shock, or can
borrow enough funds to meet this goal, she will always find it optimal to do so. It follows that the
entrepreneur covers her liquidity shock if and only if Lt+1 ≤ Xt+1, where
Xt+1 ≡ (1 + µ)Yt,t+1 +Rtqt(θHt −Kt − Zt).
The latter measures the total liquidity available to the entrepreneur during period t+ 1: it is given
by the income of the entrepreneur in that period, plus the maximal borrowing that is available to
her in that period, plus any savings from the (net) sale of capital goods in the previous period.
Combining the aforementioned observations with the budget constraints, we infer that the
present value of the entrepreneur’s consumption—also her lifetime utility—is pinned down by the
following:
Ct,t + βCt,t+1 + β2Ct,t+2 = qt(Ht −Kt − Zt) + βAt+1F (Kt, Ht) + β2At+2F (Zt, Ht)et+1
where et+1 = 1 if Lt+1 ≤ Xt+1 and et+1 = 0 if Lt+1 > Xt+1. Letting xt+1 ≡ Xt+1/Ht, we can thus
state the entrepreneur’s problem as follows:
max
kt,zt
Et
[
βAt+1f(kt) + β2λt+1At+2f(zt)− qtkt − qtzt
]
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where λt+1 ≡ Φ (xt+1) is the probability that the entrepreneur will have enough funds to cover the
liquidity shock. Equivalently, 1−λt+1 measures the “liquidity risk” faced by the entrepreneur: it is
the probability that long-term investment will become obsolete due to the unavailability of enough
liquidity in period t+ 1.
The first-order condition of the entrepreneur’s problem with respect to kt gives
βEt[At+1f ′(kt)] + β2Et[∂λt+1∂kt At+2f(zt)] = qt,
while the one with respect to zt gives
β2Et[λt+1At+2f ′(zt)] + β2Et[∂λt+1∂zt At+2f(zt)] = qt.
Combining these two first-order conditions gives the following arbitrage condition between the two
types of investment:
Et[At+1f ′(kt)] = βEt[(1− τt+1)At+2f ′(zt)], (11)
where
τt+1 ≡ (1− λt+1) +
(
∂λt+1
∂kt
− ∂λt+1∂zt
)
f(zt)
f ′(zt) (12)
The quantity τt+1, which is isomorphic to a tax on the return of long-term investment, identifies
the wedge that credit frictions introduce between the two types of investment. Understanding the
cyclical properties of this wedge is the key to understanding how credit frictions impact the cyclical
composition of investment. In what follows we thus seek to gain further insight in the equilibrium
determination of this wedge.
We start by observing that the wedge τt+1 comprises two terms. The first term captures the
probability of failure; the second term captures the marginal change in this probability caused by
a reallocation of investment from the long-term opportunity to the short-term one. The first term
would emerge even if the probability of failure were exogenous to the choices of the entrepreneur;
the second term, instead, highlights the endogeneity of the liquidity risk. When xt+1 > `max (that
is, when the entrepreneur has enough liquidity to meet even the highest possible liquidity shock),
both terms are zero and the wedge vanishes. When, instead, xt+1 < `max, the probability of failure
is positive. Furthermore,12
∂λt+1
∂kt
− ∂λt+1∂zt = Φ′(xt+1)(1 + µ)At+1f ′(kt)/`max > 0, (13)
which means that shifting a unit of capital from the long-term to the short-term investment op-
portunity necessarily reduces the probability of failure; this is simply because such a shift increases
the available liquidity in period t+ 1. It follows that τt+1 is strictly positive whenever xt+1 < `max.
12Note that xt+1 = (1 +µ)At+1f(kt) +Rtqt(θ− kt− zt), implying that ∂λt+1∂kt = Φ
′(xt+1)[(1 +µ)At+1f ′(kt)−Rtqt]
and
∂λt+1
∂zt
= Φ′(xt+1)[−Rtqt], which in turn give condition (13).
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We henceforth restrict attention to situations where credit constraints are sufficiently tight that
the liquidity risk and the associated wedge are bounded away from zero. That is, we assume that
the equilibrium satisfies xt+1 < `max, so that λt+1 < 1 and τt+1 > 0. Note then that, while this is
an assumption on equilibrium objects, it is easy to find a restriction on the exogenous parameters
of the economy that guarantees that this assumption holds. In particular, this is the case if we let
µ < µ¯, where µ¯ > 0 solves (1 + µ¯)Amaxf(θ) = `max.
Finally, we consider the cyclical properties of this wedge. Using xt+1 = (1 + µ)At+1f(kt) into
condition (13), we get that ∂λt+1∂kt −
∂λt+1
∂zt
= φλt+1
f ′(kt)
f(kt)
. Substitution this into (12), we infer that
condition (11) can be restated as follows:
Et
[
At+1f
′(θ − zt)
(
1 + βφλt+1
At+2f(zt)
At+1f(kt)
)]
= βEt
[
λt+1At+2f
′(zt)
]
(14)
To gain further insight, let us momentarily ignore the underlying uncertainty about aggregate
productivity. We can then drop the expectation operators from both conditions (11) and (14).
Since the two conditions are equivalent, we infer that the wedge is also given by
τt+1 = 1− λt+1
1 + βφλt+1
At+2f(zt)
At+1f(kt)
,
which is decreasing in λt+1 and increasing in the ratio
At+2f(zt)
At+1f(kt)
. Intuitively, one would expect the
probability of survival λt+1 to be higher in a boom, because of the improved availability of liquidity.
One would also expect the ratio At+2f(zt)At+1f(kt) to be lower in a boom, because of the mean-reversion in
the business cycle. One would thus expect the wedge τt+1 to be lower in a boom than in a recession.
Other things equal, this countercyclicality of the wedge τt would tend to boost long-term invest-
ment during a boom. However, the opportunity-cost effect that we encountered under complete
markets is still present and contributes in the opposite direction. Therefore, one would expect the
share of long-term investment to be procyclical if and only if the countercyclicality of the wedge τt+1
is sufficiently strong to offset the countervailing opportunity-cost effect. We verify these intuitions
in the following proposition, which is our second main result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that credit constraints are sufficiently tight that the liquidity risk is non-
zero in all states of nature, which is necessarily the case if µ < µ¯.
(i) The equilibrium exists and is unique.
(ii) There exists a continuous function z such that the equilibrium composition of investment is
given by kt = θ − z(At, µ) and zt = z(At, µ).
(iii) This function satisfies z(A,µ) < z∗(A) for all (A,µ), and is decreasing in µ. That is,
credit constraints depress the share of long-term investment below its complete-market value, and
the more so the tighter they are.
(iv) Suppose further that φ > 1− ρ. Then the function z(A,µ) is increasing in A. That is, the
share of long-term investment increases with a positive innovation in productivity.
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Proof. By the assumption that µ < µ¯ or, more generally, that the liquidity risk is non-zero, we
have that xt+1 < `max and λt+1 = (xt+1/`max)φ, where xt+1 = (1 + µ)At+1f(kt) and kt = θ − zt.
Using these facts, we can restate (14) as follows:
Et
[
At+1f
′(kt)
(
1 + βφ`−φmax(1 + µ)
φAφ−1t+1 f(kt)
φ−1At+2f(zt)
)]
= βEt
[
`−φmax(1 + µ)
φAφt+1f(kt)
φAt+2f
′(zt)
]
Next, using the log-linear AR(1) specification of the productivity shock to compute the various
expectations involved in the above condition, we can rewrite this condition as follows:
Aρt f
′(kt)
(
1 + βφδ(1 + µ)φAρ(φ−1)t f(kt)
φ−1Aρ
2
t f(zt)
)
= βδ(1 + µ)φAρφt f(kt)
φAρ
2
t f
′(zt),
where δ is a positive constant defined by δ ≡ `−φmaxE[νρ+φt ]. Finally, rearranging the above gives the
following:
f ′(zt)
f ′(θ − zt) =
A
ρ(1−ρ−φ)
t
βδ(1 + µ)φf(θ − zt)φ + φ
f(zt)
f(θ − zt) (15)
Note that the left-hand side is continuous and decreasing in zt, while the right-hand side is contin-
uous and increasing in zt. Furthermore, the right-hand side is continuous and decreasing in µ; it
is continuous in At; and it is increasing in At [resp., decreasing] if and only if 1− ρ− φ > 0 [resp.,
1 − ρ − φ < 0]. Parts (ii), (iii) and (iv) then follow from the Implicit Function Theorem. Finally,
part (iii) implies that, for all (A,µ), z(A,µ) < zmax ≡ z∗(Amin). Along with the assumption
lmean < Aminf(θ − zmax), this guarantees that consumption is positive in all states. Part (i) then
follows from this fact together with part (ii). QED
The property that the share of long-term investment is lower than under complete markets
is a direct implication of our result that τt+1 > 0, namely that the liquidity shock introduces a
positive wedge between the marginal products of the long-term and the short-term investment. As
mentioned already, this wedge reflects, not only the positive probability that the long-term invest-
ment will get disrupted by a sufficiently high liquidity shock, but also the consequent precautionary
motive for short-term investment.
Part (iii) of the above proposition then extends this result by showing that the share of long-term
investment decreases mononotinically with the tightness of the borrowing constraints. Intuitively,
as credit constraints become tighter, the probability of disruption increases and the precautionary
motive gets reinforced, implying that long-term investment is further depressed.
Turning to the cyclical behavior of the composition of investment, we first note that this is
governed by two conflicting effects. On the one hand, a positive productivity shock raises the
opportunity cost of long-term investment (the marginal product of short-term investment). This
opportunity-cost effect, which is equally present under complete and incomplete markets, pushes
the economy to shift resources away from long-term investment during a boom. On the other
hand, a positive productivity shock also improves the availability of liquidity, thereby reducing the
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probability of disruption, the precautionary motive for short-term investment, and the wedge τt+1.
This liquidity-risk effect, which emerges only when markets are incomplete, pushes the economy in
the opposite direction: it motivates entrepreneurs to invest relatively more in long-term projects
during a boom.
Part (iv) of the above proposition establishes that the liquidity-risk effect dominates if and only
if φ is sufficiently high relative to 1 − ρ. Intuitively, this is because a higher φ strengthens the
liquidity-risk effect by raising the cyclical elasticity of the liquidity risk, while a higher ρ dampens
the opportunity-cost effect by increasing the persistence of the business cycle.13
Comparing the result of Proposition 2 with that of Proposition 1, we conclude that the share of
long-term investment turns from countercyclical under complete markets to procyclical when two
conditions are satisfied: credit constraints are tight enough that they are always binding (µ < µˆ);
and the implied liquidity risk is sufficiently procyclical (φ > 1 − ρ). This result thus provides us
with a very sharp contrast between complete and incomplete markets—a sharp contrast that best
illustrates the theoretical contribution of our paper. In what follows, we discuss how our results
need to be qualified if one of the above two conditions fails– the sharpness is then somewhat lost,
but the essence remains intact.
4.3 Discussion
When the conditions µ < µ¯ and φ > 1 − ρ are violated, the sharp contrast between complete and
incomplete markets that we obtained in the preceding analysis is lost. In particular, when µ is high
enough, the borrowing constraint stops binding for sufficiently high productivity shocks, and the
liquidity risk vanishes for these states. The share of long-term investment is then locally decreasing
with the productivity shock, at least for an upper range of the state space. When, on the other
hand, φ is less than 1− ρ, the share of long-term investment is countercyclical no matter whether
the credit constraint is binding or not.
Nevertheless, a weaker version of our result survives. As long as µ is low enough that the
probability of disruption is positive for a non-empty subset of the state space, the liquidity-risk
effect that we discussed earlier remains present for this same subset of the state space: it might
vanish for sufficiently high states, and it might never be strong enough to offset the conflicting
opportunity-cost effect, but it always contributes some procyclicality in the share of long-term
investment relative to the complete-markets case. In this sense, credit frictions may not always
turn the countercycality of long-term investment upside down, but they do tend to mitigate it.
Finally, note that as long as the liquidity risk is bounded away from zero (which is necessarily
the case when µ < µ¯), the cyclical elasticity of the liquidity risk is pinned down by φ alone, while
13This intuition suggest that ρ should not be interpreted too literally as the autocorrelation of the exogenous shock,
but rather more generally as the persistence of the impulse response of output to the underlying shock.
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µ matters only for the level of the liquidity risk. This explains why the cyclical properties of the
composition of investment in the above proposition are governed solely by a comparison of φ with
ρ and not by µ. However, when the liquidity risk vanishes in some states (which is the case for
µ sufficiently high), then µ starts mattering also for the cyclical elasticity of the liquidity risk.
In particular, a lower µ implies a smaller range of At for which the liquidity risk vanishes, and
therefore a larger subset of the state space for which the procyclical liquidity-risk effect is present.
Combining these observations, we conclude that the core theoretical prediction of our paper
can be stated as follows.
Main Prediction. Other things equal, tighter credit constraints make it more likely that the share
of long-term investment increases with a positive productivity shock.
We expect this prediction to extend well beyond the specific model of this paper, for it rests only on
two highly plausible properties: that long-term investment is relatively more sensitive to liquidity
risk, by the mere fact that it takes longer to complete; and that liquidity risk is more severe in
recessions than in booms. We will test this prediction in Section 6 below.
5 Reinterpretation and additional results
In this section we provide a re-interpretation of the productivity shock that illustrates that our
insights need not be unduly sensitive to the details of the underlying business-cycle shocks, while
also facilitating our subsequent empirical investigation. We then proceed to study the predictions
that our theory makes regarding the dynamics of output growth.
5.1 Reinterpreting the productivity shock
In our model, the source of the business cycle is a TFP shock. However, one should not take this too
literally. Rather, the productivity shock in our model is meant to capture more broadly a variety
of supply and demand shocks that may cause variation in firm profits and thereby in the returns
of the two types of investment. For example, in our empirical analysis, we seek to re-interpret the
productivity shock as a particular type of terms-of-trade shock, because we find this to be best
from the perspective of econometric identification. We now present a variant of our model that
justifies this re-interpretation.
The economy is now open to international trade. In particular, the economy continues to
produce a single consumption good, but can now export this good to the rest of the world and can
import from it a variety of other consumption goods. In addition, the economy imports a particular
intemediate input—think of it as oil—that is used in the production of the domestic good.
Consider an entrepreneur born in period t. Re-interpret Ct,t+n as a CES composite of all the
goods the entrepreneur consumes and let Pc,t denote the price index of this composite relative to
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the domestic good. Next, let Pm,t denote the price of the aforementioned imported intermediate
input relative to the domestic good; let Mt denote the quantity of this input that the entrepreneur
purchases; and let the technologies the entrepreneur uses to produce the domestic good in periods
t+ 1 and t+ 2 be given, respectively, by
Yt,t+1 = (Mt+1)1−η(At+1F (Kt, Ht))η and Yt,t+2 = (Mt+2)1−η(At+2F (Zt, Ht))η
Finally, let Y˜t,t+n denote the real value (in terms of the consumption composite) of the net income
that the entrepreneur enjoys in period t + n once she has optimized over the use of the imported
input:
Y˜t,t+n ≡ 1
Pc,t+1
max
Mt+n
[Yt,t+n − Pm,t+nMt,t+n].
It is straightforward to characterize the optimal use of the intermediate input and thereby to
show that
Y˜t,t+1 = A˜t+1F (Kt, Ht) and Y˜t,t+1 = A˜t+2F (Zt, Ht),
where
A˜t ≡ ηP−1c,t P
− 1−η
η
m,t At
is a composite of the productivity shock and the relative prices of the imported goods. We can
then repeat the entire analysis of our baseline model simply by replacing Yt,t+n with Y˜t,t+n, and At
with A˜t. Therefore, we can indeed reinterpret a positive productivity shock as a reduction in the
relative price of either the imported consumption goods or the imported intermediate input—that
is, as a positive shock to the country’s terms of trade.
Of course, this exact equivalence between productivity and terms-of-trade shock may not hold
in richer models.14 Rather, the purpose of the above example is to clarify that we wish to take the
productivity shock only as a metaphor for a variety of aggregate shocks that may affect firm profits
and investment returns. The choice of our empirical proxy for these shocks will then be guided
primarily by econometric considerations.
5.2 Propagation and amplification
We now study the predictions of our model for the endogenous component of productivity, as
captured by the Ht. Recall that the law of motion for Ht is assumed to be Ht+1 = Γ(Ht, Z˜t,Kt),
where Γ is homogeneous of degree 1 and where Z˜t is the amount of long-term investments that
survive the liquidity shock. Using this along with the facts that, in equilibrium, Z˜t = λt+1Zt,
Zt = ztHt, and Kt = (θ − zt)Ht, we infer the equilibrium growth rate of H is given by
Ht+1
Ht
= γ(zt, λt+1)
14For example, if there is both a tradeable and a non-tradeable sector, a terms-of-trade shock will increase returns
in the tradeable sector much like a productivity shock, but will also cause a reallocation across the two sectors that
is unlike the symmetric effect of an aggregate productivity shock.
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where the function γ is defined by γ(z, λ) ≡ Γ(1, λz, θ − z). Furthermore, by the assumption that
Γ(H,Z,K) increases with Z for given K and that it increases with the ratio Z/K for given Z +K,
we have that the function γ is increasing in both its arguments. Using these observations along with
our results regarding the cyclical composition of investment, we reach the following characterization
of the growth rate of the efficiency of labor.
Proposition 3 (i) There exist functions h∗ and h such that Ht+1/Ht = h∗(At) when markets
are complete and Ht+1/Ht = h(At, νt+1, µ) when markets are incomplete (where νt+1 denotes the
innovation in productivity between periods t and t+ 1).
(ii) Suppose µ < µ¯, or more generally that the liquidity risk is bounded away from zero. Then,
h(At, νt+1, µ) is necessarily lower than h∗(At), it is increasing in µ, and it is increasing in νt+1.
That is, the endogenous component of productivity growth is lower under incomplete markets than
under complete markets, and the more so the lower µ or the lower the innovation in productivity.
(ii) Suppose further that φ > 1 − ρ. Then, h(At, νt+1, µ) is increasing in At. In contrast,
h∗(At) is necessarily decreasing in At. That is, the endogenous component of productivity growth
increases with the beginning-of-period productivity under incomplete markets, whereas it decreases
with it under complete markets.
Proof. Part (i) follows from our preceding discussion, letting
h∗(A) ≡ γ(z∗(A), 1) and h(A, ν, µ) ≡ γ(z(A,µ), λ(A, ν, µ))
where λ(A, ν, µ) ≡ Φ((1 + µ)Aρνf(θ − z(A,µ)) identifies the equilibrium probability of survival.
Part (ii), on the other hand, follows from combining the monotonicity of γ with the properties
that z(A,µ) < z∗(A) and λ(A, ν, µ) < 1 (from part (i) of Proposition 2) and the observation
that λ(A, ν, µ) increases with ν. Finally consider part (iii). The claim that h∗(At) decreases with
At follows directly from the result that z∗(At) is decreasing in At (from Proposition 1) and the
monotonicity of γ. Turning to the incomplete-markets growth rate, we know (from Proposition 2)
that zt = z(At, µ) increases with both At and µ. It is possible to show that λt = λ(At, νt+1, µ) also
increases with At and µ. Towards this goal, rewrite condition (15) as follows:
f ′(zt)
f ′(θ − zt) − φ
f(zt)
f(θ − zt) =
A
ρ(1−ρ)
t
βδλt+1ν
−φ
t+1
Note then that the left-hand side is decreasing in zt, and thereby decreasing in At and µ, while the
right-hand side is increasing in At and independent of µ. It follows that λt+1 is indeed increasing
in At and µ, as claimed. The monotonicity of γ then implies that h(At, νt+1, µ) is also increasing
in At and µ. QED
This result follows from the combination of our earlier results regarding the composition of
investment with the property that long-term investments are relatively more conducive to produc-
tivity growth than short-term ones. While we have only assumed the latter property, rather than
19
derive it from deeper micro-foundations, we nevertheless think that this assumption is both highly
plausible and empirically relevant. Furthermore, note that this result would only be re-inforced if we
let the rate of productivity growth depend on the fraction of long-term investments that survive, as
opposed to its entire level; the property that some long-term investments get disrupted would then
further depress the growth rate of H, while the property that this fraction is countercyclical would
further strengthen the procyclicality of the growth rate of H under incomplete markets. Finally,
translating this result in terms of GDP growth, we reach the following two testable predictions:
Auxiliary predictions. (i) In the short run, tighter credit constraints amplify the response of
output to exogenous business-cycles shocks. (ii) In the long run, they lead to lower mean growth.
The second prediction is consistent with prior work studying the empirical cross-country rela-
tionship between measures of financial development and the long-run growth rate. The first one,
on the other hand, will be an important part of our own empirical investigation in Section 6.
5.3 On the relationship between volatility and growth
Combining these last two predictions, we infer that countries with tighter credit constraints should
experience both lower and more volatile growth rates. Thus, as long as one fails to control for the
tightness of credit constraints, our model predicts that one should find a negative partial cross-
country correlation between growth and volatility.
This observation provides one possible interpretation of the empirical findings of Ramey and
Ramey (1995) through the lens of our model: the negative cross-country correlation between growth
and volatility observed in the data may reflect a spurious correlation induced by unmeasured cross-
country differences in financial development, rather than any causal effect of uncertainty on growth.
Moreover, this negative correlation need not diminish once one controls for the level of aggregate
investment, for what matters is its composition.
Another possible interpretation of the aforementioned empirical relationship through the lens of
our model rests on the causal effect of uncertainty on the composition of investment, and thereby on
productivity growth. Unfortunately, we have been unable to provide any general result on this front
because the comparative statics of the equilibrium with respect to the variance of the productivity
shock are quite complex and involve various additional effects. However, the following discussion
sheds some light on why it is quite plausible that more volatility may cause a lower mean growth
rate within the context of our model.
As long as credit constraints are neither too tight nor too loose, we expect them to bind for
sufficiently low productivity shocks but not for sufficiently high shocks. This makes it quite likely
that the probability of survival, λt+1, is a concave function of the productivity shock—and therefore
that the mean level of this probability decreases with a mean-preserving spread in the productivity
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shock. In other words, we expect higher aggregate volatility to increase the mean level of the
idiosyncratic liquidity risk. But then we also expect higher volatility to depress the growth rate of
the economy, both by reducing the demand for long-term investments (an ex-ante effect) and by
reducing the survival rate of such long-term investment (an ex-post effect).
Furthermore, as long as credit constraints are neither too tight nor too loose, we expect the
share of long-term investment, zt, to be an increasing function of the productivity shock when
the shock is sufficiently low (so that the borrowing constraint binds), and a decreasing function
of it when the shock is sufficiently high (so that the borrowing constraint does not bind). In this
sense, we expect the share of long-term investment to be a concave function of the productivity
shock, much like the probability of survival. But then we also expect the mean level of long-term
investment to fall when volatility is higher, once again contributing to lower growth.
The combination of these observations makes us believe that a negative causal effect of volatility
on mean growth is quite likely within the context of our model. However, we need to qualify this
prediction with the following important observation. If the credit constrains are sufficiently tight
that the probability of survival is zero (or nearly zero) even for the mean productivity shock, then
a mean preserving spread in the productivity shock may actually increase the mean probability of
survival, and thereby stimulate long-term investment and growth. In essence, average conditions
in the economy are then so dire that higher volatility stimulates the economy by increasing the
likelihood of “resurrection”.
While this resurrection effect is theoretically possible, we do not expect it to be particularly
relevant in practice: if the average situation were so dire, agents would probably have opted to
avoid the liquidity risk altogether, perhaps by taking some other option that is not allowed in our
model (such as abstaining completely from entrepreneurial activity and investment). We therefore
expect that the most likely scenario is one where more volatility increases the average liquidity risk,
thereby further distorting the composition of investment and depressing productivity growth.
6 Empirical analysis
In this section, we use data on a panel of 21 OECD countries to provide evidence in support of
the key predictions of the model. We proxy for the long-term investment rate zt in the model
with the share of structural investment in total private investment; the exogenous disturbance νt
with a measure of net-export-weighted changes in international commodity prices; and the credit
tightness parameter µ with the ratio of private credit to GDP. We identify the interaction effect of
credit and shocks on growth, the composition of investment, and the overall investment rate, using
primarily the cross-country variation in private credit and the time-series variation in commodity
price shocks.
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6.1 Data description
We compute annual growth as the log difference of per capita income from the Penn World Tables,
mark 6.1 (PWT). The measures of growth and volatility used in Tables 1 and 6 are the country-
specific means and standard deviations of annual growth over the 1960-2000 period.
To test the amplification channel in our theory, we need an empirical counterpart to long-term,
productivity-enhancing investment in the model. Such systematic cross-country and time-series
data are typically not available for a large panel of countries. We thus use the share of structural
investment in total private investment for 21 OECD countries over the 1960-2000 period, from the
Source OECD Economic Outlook Database Volume 2005.
We believe that structural investment is an appropriate empirical proxy for zt in our model
because it consists of private investments in structures and housing, which are likely to be long-
term investment projects. Furthermore, these investments are likely to contribute to output growth.
In unreported results, we have confirmed that a higher share of structural investment in periods t,
t − 1 and t − 2 is associated with a higher growth rate of output between t and t + 1, controlling
for initial GDP per capita, country- and year fixed effects. In particular, our estimates imply that
a one-standard-deviation increase in the share of structural investment has a cumulative effect of
0.8% on subsequent growth. This is quite substantial compared to the average annual growth rate
in our sample, 2.6%. Moreover, these results are robust to conditioning on the current and lagged
overall investment rate.
As a measure of financial development, we use private credit, the value of credit extended to the
private sector by banks and other financial intermediaries, as a share of GDP. This is a standard
indicator in the finance and growth literature. It is usually preferred to other measures of financial
development because it excludes credit granted to the public sector and funds provided from central
or development banks. In robustness checks, we also present results with measures of total liquid
liabilities and stock market capitalization, both as a share of GDP. These data come from Levine,
Loyaza and Beck (2000).
There is significant cross-sectional and time-series variation in financial development in the
panel. Appendix Table 1 reports the 1960-2000 average and standard deviation of private credit
for each of the 21 countries in our sample. The mean value of private credit as a share of GDP
in the panel is 0.66, with a standard deviation of 0.36. For the average country, the standard
deviation of private credit over this 40-year period reaches 0.22. Similarly, the standard deviation
of private credit in the cross-section of country averages is 0.27. This variation allows us to identify
the differential effect of shocks on the economic growth of countries at different levels of financial
development.
Finally, to study the responsiveness of growth and investment to exogenous shocks, we construct
the following proxy for νt in our model. Using data on the international prices of 42 commodities
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between 1960 and 2000 from the International Financial Statistics Database of the IMF (IFS),
we first calculate the annual percentage change of the price of each commodity c, 4Pct. We then
exploit 1985-1987 data on countries’ exports and imports by product from the World Trade Analyzer
(WTA) to obtain commodity weights.15 Each country-product specific weight is equal to the net
exports of that commodity, divided by the country’s total net exports, NXic/NXi. Note that these
weights are constant over time for a given country, but vary across countries. Commodity prices,
on the other hand, vary over time but not in the cross-section. For each country i and year t, we
thus construct a weighted commodity-price shock using each commodity’s share in net exports as
weights:
Shockit =
∑
c
NXic
NXi
4 Pct.
Note that a positive commodity-price shock means that a country can import certain inputs
at lower prices and export some of its products at higher prices. Putting aside how this affects
cross-sector allocations, this terms-of-trade improvement can be interpreted within the model as
a positive νt shock, since νt is meant to capture innovations to both supply and demand. Note
also that an economy can experience large shocks even if it is not a big commodity producer or
exporter, since what is decisive for our measure is net exports.16 Moreover, even if a country
maintains relative trade balance overall and NXi is low, a substantial rise in commodity prices can
result in a large shock if the country is a big net commodities importer or exporter.
It is important for our theoretical results that νt be exogenous, that it have a positive effect
on firm returns, and that it be less than perfectly persistent. For the measure of commodity-price
shocks we use, the first two properties are automatically satisfied if the economy is small enough
to take international commodity prices as given, which is likely to be true for most countries in our
sample. The last property is easily verified in the data: the autocorrelation coefficient of shocks in
the panel of all countries with shock data is −0.032, and 0.058 for the 21 economies with data on
structural investment.
Commodity-price shocks vary substantially in our sample. As reported in Appendix Table
2, the average shock in the panel is −0.05, with a standard deviation of 1.17. Most countries
experience big fluctuations in shocks over time, and the mean country recorded a 0.60 standard
deviation in 1960-2000. The standard deviation of country averages in the cross-section is also
large, 0.26. Combined with the variation in financial development across countries and over time,
this dispersion in commodity-price shocks allows us to identify the main amplification mechanism
in the model.
15These were the earliest years for which complete data were available at the country-commodity level.
16Note also that the commodity weights for a given country do not sum to 1, but to the share of net exports of all
commodities in total net exports. This reflects the fact that countries differ in their overall exposure to commodity
price shocks.
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When analyzing the reaction of the economy to shocks, we seek to isolate the effect of financial
development from that of other institutional characteristics. For this reason, we also control for the
overall rule of law using the index provided in La Porta et al. (1998). The demographic data are
from the PWT and the schooling data are from Barro and Lee (1997). Finally, the various policy
variables used in Table 1—that is, the share of government spending in GDP, the inflation rate,
the black-market exchange-rate premium, and the degree of openness to trade—are from Levine et
al. (2000).
6.2 Impact of shocks on the composition and rate of investment
Our model predicts that long-term growth-enhancing investment should respond less to positive
exogenous shocks in countries with more developed financial sectors. We test this prediction with
annual data on the composition of investment and estimate the following specification:
LTIit
Iit
= const+ α · creditit +
∑
j=0,1,2
(δj + γj · creditit) · shocki,t−j + β ·Xit + ωi + ωt + εit (16)
The dependent variable (LTIit/Iit) is the ratio of structural investment in total private invest-
ment. We measure financial development with a moving lagged average of private credit over the
five years immediately preceding time t. The contemporaneous value of credit may vary with the
business cycle and thus capture the impact of some other omitted cyclical variable. In contrast,
the lagged average allows us to exploit the significant time variation in the level of financial devel-
opment, while also mitigating concerns about omitted variable biases and endogeneity. The three
shock variables correspond to the contemporaneous, 1-year lagged, and 2-year lagged commodity-
price shocks. The estimation of all lagged shock terms is possible because of the low autocorrelation
in commodity-price shocks.17
To control for omitted intransient country characteristics, we include country fixed effects and
cluster errors by country. We also allow for year fixed effects to capture time trends affecting all
countries in the sample. In all specifications, we control for the level of GDP per capita, which has
been averaged over the five years immediately preceding time t as private credit.
Table 2 presents our main findings. In line with our theoretical predictions, column 1 docu-
ments a negative coefficient on the interaction of private credit with the concurrent commodity-price
shock. Since financial development is positively correlated with overall development and countries’
institutional environment more generally, we need to confirm that our results reflect a credit con-
straints channel. In column 2, we thus include interactions of income per capita and the overall rule
of law with the three shock terms to isolate the independent effect of credit availability. Private
credit continues to mitigate the impact of concurrent shocks on long-term investment.
17For 11 of the 21 countries, this autocorrelation is in the [-0.10, 0.10] range. The autocorrelation exceeds 0.20 in
absolute value only for 2 countries.
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NTable 2. The response of structural investment to commodity price shocks
Dependent variable: Share of private structural investment in total private investment
Baseline specifications Shocks less than 100%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
priv credit 0.0135 0.0153 0.0141 0.0189 0.0185 0.0180
(0.32) (0.36) (0.33) (0.41) (0.40) (0.39)
priv credit*shock t -0.0087 -0.0079 -0.0069 -0.0350 -0.0521 -0.0594
(-2.08)** (-1.89)* (-2.39)** (-2.14)** (-2.45)** (-2.16)**
priv credit*shock t-1 0.0024 0.0033 0.0039 -0.0422 -0.0517 -0.0627
(0.96) (1.78)* (1.53) (-2.00)* (-2.11)** (-1.85)*
priv credit*shock t-2 0.0004 -0.0025 -0.0011 -0.0465 -0.0807 -0.1214
(0.15) (-0.90) (-0.33) (-1.71) (-2.32)** (-2.39)**
comm share*shock t -0.0001 0.0001
(-1.28) (0.09)
comm share*shock t-1 -0.0001 0.0000
(-1.82)* (-0.04)
comm share*shock t-2 -0.0001 -0.0036
(-1.19) (-2.00)*
Controls:
shocks, income yes yes yes yes yes yes
country & year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
income & rulelaw interactions no yes yes no yes yes
abs(shock)<=1 no no no yes yes yes
R-squared 0.788 0.790 0.791 0.784 0.786 0.787
# countries 21 21 21 21 21 21
728 728 728 603 603 603
Note: Annual 1960-2000 data, except where lost due to lags. shock t , shock t-1 , shock t-2 refer to the contemporaneous, 1-year and 2-
year lagged net-exports-weighted commodity price shocks. Private credit and income are measured as moving lagged averages over
(t-1, t-5). Columns 4-6 restrict the sample to observations with the absolute value of contemporaneous and lagged shocks less than
100%. All regressions include a constant term, country and year fixed effects, control for the main effects of all three shocks, and
cluster errors at the country level. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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If countries that are big natural resource producers tend to have lower levels of financial de-
velopment, our findings may reflect their higher sensitivity to commodity shocks and not a credit
constraints channel. This concern, however, does not appear to be a problem for our analysis for
three reasons. First, in the full cross-section of 128 countries with available data, the correlation
between the share of commodities in a country’s net exports and its 1960-2000 average private
credit is small in magnitude and slightly negative at −0.07. This correlation is, however, low and
slightly positive, 0.07, in the sample of 21 countries with data on structural investment which we
use in our main regressions.
Second, the country-year specific commodity-price shocks we construct take into account coun-
tries’ export characteristics. In particular, for a given change in world commodity prices, we assign
a higher shock to large net commodity exporters. The interaction terms in (16) are thus identified
from the combined variation in financial development and exposure to commodity price shocks
across countries and over time. In other words, our results indicate that two countries with the
same export profile but different levels of financial development will react differently to the same
commodity price shock.
Finally, our findings are robust to explicitly controlling for the interaction of commodity price
shocks with a country’s share of commodities in net exports,
∑
c
NXic
NXi
. As column 3 in Table 2
shows, financial development mitigates the effect of concurrent shocks on the share of structural
investment even when we include these controls.
Columns 4-6 confirm that our results also hold in the sample of country-year observations for
which the commodity-price shock does not exceed 100% in absolute value.18 One motivation for
this restriction is that extremely large shocks may signal structural changes in the economy, which
our model is not appropriate to address; another is that the response of the economy might be quite
non-linear in such extreme events. In this sub-sample, we find strong evidence for an important
mitigating role of financial development in the transmission of concurrent, once- and twice-lagged
shocks to long-term investment. All three interaction terms of interest enter negatively and are
highly economically and statistically significant. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in
the level of private credit is associated with a 0.05% reduction in the impact of a 1% adjustment
in current and lagged shocks (0.05% = 0.26 · (0.052 + 0.052 + 0.081)). These results are once again
not driven by overall development or the broad institutional environment, as proxied by GDP per
capita and rule of law respectively. They are also robust to controlling for countries’ share of
commodities in net exports.19
18The commodity-price shock may exceed 100% either because of extremely large inflation in commodity prices,
or because a country has enormous exposure to commodity shocks. Restricting the sample to [-100%, 100%] shocks
thus also partly addresses the concern about large resource producers being financially underdeveloped.
19We have also examined the sensitivity of our results to the lag structure of shocks. When we include only con-
current and once-lagged shocks, we continue to find that financial development interacts importantly with concurrent
shocks. This result is robust to controlling for overall development or the rule of law, and obtains in both the entire
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Table 3. The response of structural investment to commodity price shocks: robustness
Dependent variable: Share of private structural investment in total private investment
Fin devt measure: Private credit1960-2000 Liquid liabilities Market capitalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
fin devt -0.054 -0.053 -0.003 -0.002
(-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.05) (-0.04)
fin devt*shock t -0.012 -0.044 -0.066 -0.058 -0.089 -0.019 -0.027
(-2.89)*** (-2.39)** (-2.27)** (-3.43)*** (-3.11)*** (-0.55) (-0.77)
fin devt*shock t-1 0.003 -0.052 -0.052 -0.062 -0.073 -0.043 -0.055
(1.26) (-1.76)* (-1.58) (-3.10)*** (-2.90)*** (-1.48) (-1.43)
fin devt*shock t-2 0.000 -0.087 -0.113 -0.054 -0.095 -0.053 -0.066
(-0.10) (-4.79)*** (-4.89)*** (-1.56) (-2.61)** (-1.25) (-1.25)
Controls:
shocks, income yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country & year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
income & rulelaw interactions no no yes no yes no yes
abs(shock)<=1 no yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.782 0.776 0.777 0.752 0.756 0.783 0.786
# countries 21 21 21 19 19 19 19
N 764 639 639 537 537 374 374
Note: Annual 1960-2000 data, except where lost due to lags. The measure of financial development is as indicated in the column heading. Financial
development and income are averages over 1960-2000 in the first 3 columns, and moving lagged averages over (t-1, t-5) in columns 4-7. shock t
shock t-1 , shock t-2 refer to the contemporaneous, 1-year and 2-year lagged net-exports-weighted commodity price shocks. All regressions include a
constant term, country and year fixed effects, control for the main effects of all three shocks, and cluster errors at the country level. t-statistics in
parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
The measure of private credit used in Table 2 is a moving lagged average over the preceding
5 years. While there is time-series variation in financial development and using this lagged value
mitigates potential endogeneity and reverse causality concerns, some bias may remain if shocks
trigger slow changes in the level of private credit. The empirical evidence, however, rejects this
possibility. The simple correlations between private credit and concurrent, once- and twice-lagged
shocks are statistically insignificant at −0.021, −0.018 and −0.017, respectively. As Appendix
Table 3 demonstrates, when we regress the moving average of private credit on the three shocks, we
always obtain insignificant coefficients. This is true in the full sample of country-year observations
with data on private credit and shocks, as well as in the restricted sample with data on structural
investment (columns 1 and 5). Moreover, the same result obtains when we control for country
and year fixed effects (columns 2 and 6), when we exploit only shocks below 100% (columns 3 and
7), and when we cluster the error term by country (columns 4 and 8). We thus believe that our
measure of private credit does not endogenously respond to movements in commodity prices.
In columns 1-3 of Table 3, we nevertheless confirm the robustness of our findings to a measure of
financial development that varies only in the cross-section: the country average of private credit over
the entire period in the sample (1960-2000). Once again, the interaction of private credit with the
sample and the sub-sample with shocks smaller than 100%.
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concurrent shock is always negative and significant, as is the interaction with twice-lagged shocks
in the sample with non-extreme shocks.20 In the rest of Table 3, we then explore the robustness
of our results to two alternative indicators of financial development: the volume of liquid liabilities
and total stock market capitalization as a share of GDP. We find negative and significant point
estimates on the interaction of liquid liabilities with all three shocks, but imprecisely estimated
negative coefficients when we use market capitalization.2122
Our model predicts that credit constraints can modify the impact of shocks on the composition
of investment and thereby amplify volatility, even if they do not affect the impact of shocks on the
aggregate investment rate. Clearly, the validity of our theory is not contradicted if we find evidence
that credit constraints affect both the composition and the overall rate of investment. However, its
empirical relevance is certainly magnified if we find no effect on the aggregate investment rate.
In Table 4, we document that lower levels of financial development do not predict a stronger im-
pact of commodity-price shocks on the share of investment in total GDP. If anything, tighter credit
dampens, rather than amplifies, the reaction of total investment to shocks. This result is robust
to allowing the effect of shocks to vary with countries’ GDP per capita, rule of law or commodity
share of net exports (columns 3 and 4); to using the 1960-2000 average value of private credit
(column 5); and to restricting the sample to shocks within the [-100%, 100%] range (columns 2-5).
These findings directly contradict models that focus on how financial frictions amplify the impact
of shocks on aggregate investment, and strengthen our position that other channels, such as the
composition of investment and endogenous productivity, are key to understanding the amplification
effects of credit constraints.
Finally, we test whether our results on the composition of investment change once we control
for the overall rate of investment to GDP, which we can also think of as a proxy for the overall
supply of savings. As columns 6-10 of Table 4 show, our main findings continue to hold: financial
development mitigates the impact of shocks on long-run investment even holding the overall level
of investment fixed.
Remark. The preceding empirical analysis proxied long-term investment with the share of
structural investment. In a previous version of this paper and other unreported results, we have
also considered the share of R&D spending. We obtained qualitatively similar results, although
point estimates were sometimes imprecisely estimated. This is probably because of data limitations:
most countries report almost zero R&D spending, indicating that reported R&D spending is a very
poor empirical measure for our purposes. See, however, Aghion et al. (2008) for complementary
evidence using R&D data from panel of French firms.
20We obtain similar results when we use an initial value of private credit (results available upon request).
21The reported results use a lagged moving average for liquid liabilities and market capitalization, and concentrate
on shocks smaller than 100% in absolute value. Similar results obtain with country averages or unrestricted shocks.
22Since data on liquid liabilities and market capitalization is available for fewer country-years than private credit,
columns 4-7 in table 4 have fewer observations.
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6.3 Impact of shocks on growth
So far we have documented that tighter credit amplifies the impact of shocks on the composition of
investment, without amplifying their impact on the overall rate of investment. This section shows
that financial frictions also reinforce the effect of shocks on income and productivity growth.
We first examine the sensitivity of growth to commodity-price shocks in an annual panel between
1960 and 2000. We estimate the following specification:
∆yit = const+ α · creditit + β · yit−2 +
∑
j=0,1,2
(δj + γj · creditit) · shocki,t−j + ωi + ωt + εit. (17)
Here, ∆yit denotes annual growth for country i in time t. As before, the three shock variables
correspond to the contemporaneous, 1-year lagged, and 2-year lagged commodity-price shocks. We
continue to use a moving lagged average of private credit over the preceding 5 years as an indicator
of financial development. We also include country and year fixed effects, condition on twice-lagged
GDP per capita, and cluster errors at the country level.
The left half of Table 5 presents our baseline results. In line with our model’s predictions,
we find that once-lagged commodity-price shocks boost growth today, but financial development
mitigates this effect. This result obtains in the sample with shocks under 100% in absolute value
(column 2), and is robust to allowing growth to respond differentially across countries at varying
levels of commodity exposure in net exports (column 3). Our findings are also unchanged when
we identify the effects of financial development purely from the cross-sectional variation in average
private credit over the 1960-2000 period (column 4).
The right half of Table 5 establishes that none of these effects are channeled through the level
of aggregate investment. More specifically, we control for the concurrent, once- and twice-lagged
values of total investment as a share of GDP, and find our results unchanged. This test serves an
additional purpose as well. In the absence of a direct TFP measure, conditioning on aggregate
investment and GDP per capita is akin to controlling for total capital, and hence to isolating
productivity improvements above and beyond capital accumulation. In support of our model, we
find that this rough measure of TFP grows faster after adverse shocks in countries with more
abundant credit. The effect of financial development is most pronounced at one lag.23
Since credit constraints amplify the business cycle in our theoretical framework, an additional
implication of our model is that growth should be less persistent at lower levels of financial devel-
opment. We find evidence consistent with this prediction in Table 6, where we examine the cross-
sectional correlation between countries’ average private credit and the autocorrelation of their GDP
per capita growth over the 1960-2000 period. As expected, we establish a positive and statistically
23All of these findings are robust to the addition of the share of structural investment to the set of right-hand
variables. When these variables are added, their effect is as in the model: for any given rate of investment, a higher
fraction of structural investment tends to predict higher growth. Results available upon request.
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significant correlation, which is robust to controlling for cross-country differences in rule of law and
economic development (1960-2000 average income) (column 2). Our findings are also not driven
by the volatility of output growth (column 3) or the volatility and autocorrelation of commodity
shocks (column 4). These results indicate that financially underdeveloped countries experience less
persistent growth rates, and foreshadow our observations for growth volatility in the next section.
6.4 On the cross-country correlation between volatility and growth
Having tested the core predictions of our theory, we now return to the negative cross-country
correlation between volatility and growth, which was part of the motivating background. We
already discussed how our model provides a simple spurious interpretation of this correlation.
But we also indicated that, when idiosyncratic liquidity risk increases with aggregate volatility,
the causal effect of volatility on growth is expected to be more negative the tighter the credit
constraints. While this possibility is not as central to our theory as the predictions we have already
tested, it is of special interest because of its implications for welfare and policy: it suggests that
the cost of business cycles may be higher in countries with lower financial development, as well as
that stabilization policies can have more favorable growth effects in such countries.
We thus close the empirical part of the paper by taking a first look at whether such a regularity is
present in the data. In Table 6, we repeat the Ramey and Ramey (1995) regression with the addition
of private credit and its interaction with volatility. We find that the negative impact of volatility
on growth tends to be, indeed, stronger in countries at lower levels of financial development. This
effect is economically important. For example, in the specification of column 1, a one-standard-
deviation improvement in private credit would reduce the negative growth impact of a 1% rise in
volatility by −0.14%. This effect is robust to controlling for demographics, policy variables, and
the investment rate (columns 2, 4, and 5), but it looses significance if we control for a non-linear
effect of private credit (columns 3 and 6). The main and interaction effects of private credit are,
however, always jointly statistically significant. We conclude that the negative relation between
growth and volatility appears to stronger in countries with tighter credit, in accordance with the
aforementioned theoretical prediction.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper identified a novel propagation mechanism in the impact of credit frictions on the cyclical
composition of investment. We first showed how the share of long-term investment turns from
countercyclical under complete markets to procyclical under sufficiently tight credit constraints.
We then showed how through this channel credit frictions can lead to both lower mean growth and
amplified volatility, even though they seem to have no effect on the impact of shocks on aggregate
saving and investment. We finally provided some supporting empirical evidence.
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Table 6. Growth, volatility and credit constraints
Dependent variable: Average GDP per capita growth, 1960-2000
No investment With investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
initial income -0.003 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006 -0.009 -0.010
(-1.51) (-3.79)*** (-4.37)*** (-3.78)*** (-3.97)*** (4.42)***
growth volatility -0.161 -0.257 -0.137 -0.172 -0.218 -0.134
(-2.35)** (-2.46)** (-1.27) (-3.15)*** (-2.37)** (-1.40)
private credit 0.014 -0.005 0.064 -0.004 -0.015 0.036
(1.20) (-0.35) (2.37)** (-0.43) (-1.33) (1.43)
volatility*private credit 0.520 0.757 0.458 0.441 0.575 0.375
(2.23)** (2.50)** (1.50) (2.36)** (2.14)** (1.37)
investment/GDP 0.001 0.001 0.001
(7.59)*** (4.45)*** (4.03)***
Controls:
pop growth, sec enroll no yes yes no yes yes
Levine et al. policy set no yes yes no yes yes
private credit 2 no no yes no no yes
F-test (volatility terms) 0.046 0.027 0.309 0.008 0.047 0.322
F-test (credit terms) 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.102 0.011
R-squared 0.356 0.529 0.584 0.591 0.644 0.673
N 106 73 73 106 73 73
Note: All regressors are averages over the 1960-2000 period, except for initial income and secondary school enrollment,
which are taken for 1960. Growth volatility is constructed as the standard deviation of annual growth in the 1960-2000
period. The Levine et al. policy set of controls includes government size as a share of GDP, inflation, black market
premium an rade openness Cons an erm no shown s atistics in parenthesis *** ** significan at 1% 5% an 10%,   .    . -   . , ,    , ,  .
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Needless to say, both the theoretical and the empirical lessons of this paper have their limita-
tions. Also, any careful quantitative assessment would require that our mechanism be embedded
within a more standard business-cycle model—an exercise that we leave for future research. We
nevertheless hope that our findings may draw more attention to the important interaction between
credit constraints and the composition of investment, and the implications of this interaction for
short-run fluctuations and long-run growth.
Largely motivated by our findings, Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere and Rogoff (2006) proceed to
investigate the relationship between growth and exchange-rate volatility, while Aghion, Hemous,
and Kharroubi (2009) look at the relationship between growth and the cyclicality of fiscal policy.
The former paper finds that exchange-rate volatility has a stronger negative effect on growth in
countries with tighter credit, while the latter paper finds that countercyclical fiscal policy has a
stronger positive effect on growth in industries with higher financial dependence within countries
with tighter credit. Finally, using a panel of French firms, Aghion et al. (2008) find that the
share of R&D investment—another natural measure of long-term investments—is more procyclical
in firms that face tighter credit constraints. Combined, this subsequent work complements the
contribution of our paper and further highlights the value of investigating the joint determination
of the composition of investment, short-run volatility, and long-run growth.
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